True, I had (by chance) picked stocks on the move in previous rounds, and that has been helpful when a peak turned downward.
Thursday, October 04, 2007
Mockery
Tuesday, October 02, 2007
Last round of picks
Saturday, August 18, 2007
Down a lot
Tuesday, August 14, 2007
Analysis
Factors in considering purchase of Tesoro (TSO)
1. About TSO from Yahoo! Finance, Profile: Tesoro Corporation and its subsidiaries engage in refining and marketing petroleum products in the United States. It operates in two segments, Refining and Retail. The Refining segment manufactures and sells gasoline and gasoline blendstocks, jet fuel, diesel fuel, and heavy fuel oils to the commercial customers primarily in the midcontinental and the western United States. This segment also manufactures liquefied petroleum gas, petroleum coke, and asphalt. The Retail segment distributes motor fuels to wholesale and retail customers, as well as to commercial end-users through a network of gas stations. This segment sells gasoline and diesel fuel to retail customers through company-operated retail stations and branded jobber/dealers in the midcontinental and the western United States.
2. ‘Magic formula’ characteristics:
- 21% earnings yield (reverse of PE, indicating a calculated PE of 4.76). ie – it is a cheap stock.
- Return on invested capital of 25 – 50%. ie – it is a good company.
i. According to Yahoo! Finance Key Statistics, Return on Equity is 37%, Return on Assets is 15%
ii. By my own calculations of Return on Capital (earnings before interest and taxes divided by total stockholder equity), result in rather higher numbers: >70% for each of the last two years.
3. Discounted Cash Flow analysis
- Discount rate: 12% - I believe that this is mildly conservative considering the size of the company.
i. I found online a DCF of TSO from 2003. At the time, they estimated a discount rate of 8.4% and then to be conservative jacked it up to 11%.
- FCF calculated as $647M from annual reports.
- Assumed growth in FCF for the next 5 years: 15%. This is very conservative when compared to growth over the last two years. From the annual reports, FCF growth was 38% 2006 over 2005, and 41% 2005 over 2004.
i. Assumed growth after initial 5 years: 3% for years 6 – 10, and 0% for years 10 onwards. 3% is conservative; I think that it’s more typically about half of the first five years. 0% is less conservative; I think that it’s more typically 3%, but some of these analyses say that you can’t count on anything ten years out, so assume a 0% rate after 10 years.
- Current stock price = $49.30
- Shares outstanding: 138.83M
- Excess cash and equivalents (from Key Statistics) = 169M
- Total debt = 1.79B
- Value of operating leases = $39M (the value at the end of 2006. The minimum repayment for 2007 is $5M)
- Value of outstanding stock options = $151M
- Results: Intrinsic value = $63.12 / share, with a 21.9% MOS. If it is agreed that my estimates are conservative wherever possible, then the MOS is probably greater.
- HOWEVER, I am estimating future growth rate based on past performance. Analyst estimates consider that the next five years will be considerably lower than the past, only 6% per year over the next 5 years. If correct, then this will be a LOSING proposition. I disagree with analysts because i) I think that oil alternatives will be a lot slower to come to market than popularly considered, and ii) we may or may not hold on that long; in the nearer term, I suspect that oil will continue closer to its current trajectory. With a 12% average growth rate in FCF over the next several years, we might expect a CAGR of ~ 15%.
3. This quarter TSO paid down all debt on their short-term line of credit. The CEO says that they don’t have any more debt that they can pay down early, so future cash flows will be put towards organic growth of the company. They had originally targeted paying off all of this debt by the end of the year.
4. Current assets (not including inventory, in order to be conservative) = $1,939,000. Current liabilities = $1,672,000 (at year-end ’06). That assets outweigh liabilities is a Good Thing. A 2:1 ratio would be better, but this is pretty good.
5. They acquired a refinery near LA, further strengthening their presence on the West Coast. (Other refineries are near SF, in Washington, Alaska, Hawaii, North Dakota and Utah.)
6. They also sell gasoline and diesel retail, at gas stations under the Tesoro and Mirastar brands, as well as through unbranded gas stations. This seems to be a no-growth part of their company, in terms of actual volume of gas sold, but it has grown revenue, due to increasing gas prices. Management is trying to take advantage of this, having made a deal in January to acquire 140 additional gas stations in CA. If gas prices fall, this may turn out to be a bad idea, but in the short term, it’s probably a great move. It depends on how much effort (ie cost) it takes to max out the volume capabilities of each gas station. I might try to focus more on finding new retail stations to sell to.
7. From the Yahoo! Finance Profile page: Tesoro Corp.'s Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ®) as of 1-Aug-07 is better than 100% of Russell 3000 companies and 99.6% of Energy companies.
8. Some recent insider purchase: 10,000 on Aug. 9 at ~$48; May 7, 5,000 and 1,000 at $58 by two different directors.
9. Competitors: Valero seems to have a similar model – refining and retail sales. It’s about 5 – 6 times the market cap, DCF analysis gives a similar MOS given the same assumptions, it has a similar PE and a ROC of ~56% last year and ~70% the year before. It’s comparable to TSO.
- However, I like that TSO has the smaller market cap, as it typically implies more possibility of growth. Look at how VLO’s ROC declined dramatically last year relative to the year before, while TSO’s ROC was much more stable.
10. My major concern with TSO is this: it is in a hot industry. If the demand for oil were to drop, or even if the market were to suddenly stop investing in oil companies, TSO could be in for a stall, or even a drop. The recent drop in share price, from a high of ~$64, may provide a margin of safety against this possibility.
Wednesday, July 18, 2007
Western Downgrade
Profits cubed
Friday, July 13, 2007
Fierce Bioanalysis
Monday, July 09, 2007
RNAi rocks
Wednesday, July 04, 2007
Congratulations
Monday, July 02, 2007
MFI Turnover
Sunday, July 01, 2007
Spin-off article
I came across this article about spin-offs. Not much new here (the only reference is to You Can Be A Stock Market Genius) but maybe some useful links for further information.
Monday, June 25, 2007
Almost a year
VPHM - 57%
TRLG - 27%
BLD - 12%
ISNS - 20%
DECK - 150%
The weighted average return is 55%
Dow Jones - 20%
S&P 500 - 18%
Russell 2000 - 15%
Sunday, May 20, 2007
Options revisited
Monday, March 26, 2007
Updated Returns
The Magic Formula Investing portfolio is also doing nicely, with an IRR of 39.7%. DECK has always been doing well, while WNR is a recent addition to my top-movers. VPHM was once my first double, but now has pulled back to the number three slot. FCX was well under the price I paid for it for a while, but has now clawed its way back to positive territory. UEPS seems to keep fighting with that $30 upper limit. It keeps making it there, and then falling back to just a little more than I bought it for.
I notice that the mid-range stocks of the MFI portfolio have had a lower return than the mid-range stocks of the MF portfolio, but the big winners have won bigger - in other words, there's a longer tail for my more moderately-performing MF portfolio (figure). Some of this effect is due to the fact that some purchases are more recent than others; however, this is not all of the effect, because both portfolios include stocks that are recent purchases as well as stocks that are older. In Marshall's study of monthly MFI portfolios, he found that they beat the Russell 3ooo most months. I wonder what the distributions of returns were within each portfolio? Is it the case that each portfolio has a small number of big winners with the majority of stocks giving moderate returns? This may be worth further study...
And finally, here's the biotech portfolio that I've been reconsidering so much lately. There is a bunch to say, though. The IRR is now -2.4%. Since my last post, Cubist found a distributor for Cubicin in Japan, the Merck subsidiary Banyu. They sold the rights for $6M. This seems somewhat low to me. Not that I've got some great insight into what that should have sold for... but it just seems low. And not just to me. A January article over at the Motley Fool predicted that they'd find a distributor, and that it would get them $10-$20M upfront. A big difference! A little good news, MEDX started another phase I trial with MedImmune. This had absolutely no effect on the share price, though. On the other hand, ARNA started a phase II trial, and the stock price dropped ~5%. ARNA and NOVC are also up for reconsideration. But I also want to consider this carefully. The idea with the biotech portfolio was that my understanding of the science would allow me to judge the science, not just base decisions on announcements like these. So, this is something that I'm still working on. Because it's also been an important lesson that the science is just a small part of the whole package with biotech companies.
Wednesday, March 21, 2007
A couple of notes
Mocked by the Market
Tuesday, March 13, 2007
Rethinking Biotech
The return of "Youch"
Tuesday, March 06, 2007
White Swan and New Picks
Friday, February 23, 2007
ASEI in the news
Tuesday, February 20, 2007
Goodbye, PW Eagle...
I went ahead and sold PWEI, and replaced them with OPMR. It was nice to find OPMR on the MFI list; I first became aware of OPMR in a recent Motley Fool write-up. MF essentially said that OPMR is risky, because it's in a beaten-down industry, online gaming. OPMR also has an electronic wallet division. The MF write-up convinced me that OPMR is cheap, I mean, really cheap - cheaper than the 12% EY listed on the MFI list suggests. Essentially the e-wallet division is free, and it acounts for 1/3 of the company's business. Moreover, if the company grows at anything like historical growth, it should be worth quite a bit more than it is being sold for currently: the share price seems to imply only 7% growth. So, as they said, cheap is cheap. And that was why I bought into OPMR.
Monday, February 19, 2007
MFI vs. Wilshire 5000
Friday, February 16, 2007
The *one* buyout that wasn't profitable...
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
Monster
Saturday, February 03, 2007
Evaluating management
Thursday, February 01, 2007
How to integrate strategies?
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
Short but sweet
Sunday, January 07, 2007
New Year's Reading
- Business: Is the business understandable? Does it have a consistent operating history and favorable long-term prospects?
- Management: Is management rational? Candid? Does it resist the institutional imperative?
- Financial: Return on equity is what's important, not EPS. Calculate "owner earnings," look for high profit margins and make sure that the company has created at least one dollar of market value.
- Market: What is the value of the business? Is there a margin of safety relative to the value?
I expect that these ideas will help me a lot in thinking through businesses that I am considering investing in. My strengths are understanding probabilities of companies succeeding based on various strictly financial characteristics (PE, EY, ROIC, etc.). It is more difficult for me to think through the business aspects, and I think that these tenets will help to focus my thinking.
1. Understand how the company makes money. I remember reading somewhere that Ray Kroc insisted on owning the property of all McDonald's restaurants. He was in real estate, not in the restaurant business. I have the benefit (the 'One Up' advantage) of understanding biotech. (My most recent thinking about this, though may mean that it's a benefit that encourages me to be extremely selective. I'll probably write more about the problems that are specific to biotech at some point.)
2. What's the operating history? What does the future hold? The company doesn't have to always have been successful in every type of market, but perhaps the lows should be not so low - or should be the entry point. For the future, the best type of business to own is a franchise. The kind of company that can raise prices to keep up with inflation, for which there is no substitute, which sells something that is desired or needed, and whose profits are not regulated. In other words, it needs a moat. Most companies are somewhere in between, either a strong commodity, or a weak franchise.
Phil Town in Rule #1 describes five kinds of moats: Brand, Secret, Toll, Switching and Price. A brand is trusted or recognized, a secret involves patents or trade secrets. There is a toll when a company has exclusive control of the market (monopoly), switching is when there is a high barrier to changing providers, and price is when a company can price competitors out of the market. I suspect that price is the weakest moat: a new challenger may have a difficulty competing, but anyone who does automatically drives margins lower. In fact, Buffett prefers to avoid commodities, and a moat built solely on price essentially commoditizes what is being sold. (I think.)
3. Is management rational? Watch how management reinvests cash: does it earn more than you could earn elsewhere? Cash should either earn a high return or be returned to shareholders as a dividend or through share buybacks. Is management cadid? How do they discuss failures and problems? Listen to the conference calls for this. Do they avoid the institutional imperative? Will they take solutions to problems that cause short-term loss of profitability in exchange for long-term solutions and profitability?
4. ROE is more important that EPS, because increases in EPS don't take into account the company's (hopefully) growing cash base.
5. Calculate "owner earnings," which is Net Income + Depreciation/Depletion + Amortization - Capital Expenditures. Use this to determine the value of the business: Estimate the future cash flows of the business. How? Do the owner earnings show a consistent rate of growth? Use that rate. Then discount that rate by the rate of bonds. This gives the current value of the company. I'm not sure that I've completely grasped this; it's something to come back to. In particular, I know that Motley Fool is a proponent of free cash flow and owners' earnings, so I'll look into it there.
6. High profit margins are a sign of a strong business and of management that controls costs. Look at the margin over the years. I suspect that looking at the SG&A over time will also be informative.
7. Make sure that the company creates more than a dollar of market value for every dollar retained. It's apparently a simple calculation: Determine the retained earnings by subtracting the dividends paid from the net income. Sum the retained earnings over the last ten years. Compare this value to the change in market value over the last ten years. If more market value has been created than earnings retained, then the market has valued the company more highly than its earnings.
8. Insist on a margin of safety. Buffett insists on 25%. Phil Town stresses 50%. The difference between these is that Phil Town knows that he's teaching beginners who have a higher probability of having made a mistake somewhere along the way; Buffett has a better chance of correctly valuing a company that someone following Rule #1.
It is one of my major goals for the year to carry out more thorough analyses of purchases. I'm going to be looking for moats and good management more than anything else (MFI automatically finds companies selling cheaply relative to most recent earnings, although more complicated analyses could almost certainly refine the margin of safety.) I also like the idea of ensuring that the company creates more than a dollar of value per dollar retained.